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This paper investigates changes in the variety and intensity of 
formal and informal control mechanisms in offshore software 
development (OSD) projects. Based on a comparative case study 
approach our results confirm existing findings such as that the 
amount of control varies across different projects stages, but also 
contribute with new findings. For example, we found that 
particularly the quality of project deliverables in early project 
phases will lead to an increase of the amount of formal control. 
However, these quality problems do not necessarily lead to an 
increase of informal control. In return, an increase in quality of 
deliverables will subsequently decrease the amount of control. An 
important finding is that in contrast to prior studies our results do 
not support that the amount of control is directly related to project 
success. Altogether, our study contributes to the further 
understanding of the dynamics of the amount of control, its 
influencing factors and its relationship to project success. 
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Offshoring of tasks or processes is among the most discussed 
topics in both practitioner and academic literature [1]. In past 
years, the offshoring industry grew significantly to $ 80 billion in 
2008 [2]. It is predicted that this growth will continue in the next 
five years by a compound annual growth rate of around 6.4% [3], 
regardless of the economic downturn [2]. Offshoring tasks or 
entire processes are not new phenomena. Already in the early 90s 
it became popular with Kodak shifting the operation of its 
information center to a global provider which was partly located 
in India [4, 5]. 
This paper focuses on offshore software development (OSD), 
which is defined as the design, development and testing of 
software by a supplying organization located in a foreign, low-
cost country. Nowadays, OSD is widely conducted, not only by 
Fortune 1000 companies. This has several reasons such as cost 
benefits, flexibility gains [6], increased project management and 
process quality by OSD providers [7]. While OSD offers a lot of 
opportunities and benefits, it also poses some specific challenges. 
Compared to in-house or domestically outsourced projects, 
offshore software projects are more prone to failure [8]. Apart 
from traditional software project risks, OSD is exposed to 
additional risks caused by language and cultural differences [9, 
10, 11], geographic distance [9, 12, 13], knowledge transfer 
difficulties [14, 15, 16], and challenges with regard to control and 
coordination [17, 18, 19]. 
One approach for managing risks associated with OSD is the 
exercise of control. The OSD context imposes several unique 
challenges in terms of how the client monitors, evaluates, and 
rewards or sanctions the supplier [20, 21]. Due to differences in 
cultures and goals, both client and supplier are strongly influenced 
by opportunistic behavior of the project partner [22]. For instance, 
on the one hand, the client may be worried about the supplier 
delivering inadequate software quality and thus may try to 
increase control. On the other hand, the supplier may fear that the 
client will change requirements late in the project. Moreover, 
some clients prefer interpersonal interactions which the supplier 
may regard as too costly and restrictive. Differences in 
perspectives like those described may cause the two companies to 
drag project control in different directions [23]. Furthermore, 
geographical distance further complicates control. It limits the 
ability of both parties to meet on a regular basis. As a result, 
receiving regular feedback and socializing to build up and 
maintain interpersonal relationships is difficult. To summarize, 
finding the right balance out of a variety of different control 
mechanisms and ‗customizing‘ these mechanisms to the specific 
project context remain among the biggest OSD challenges. 
Previous research has mainly focused on the control variety and 
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25]. Prior research has also investigated the dynamics of control 
in terms of how control changes across different project stages 
[21, 25]. However, no research has tried to combine these two 
streams of research, even though this has important implications 
for managers of OSD projects, trying to exercise the right mix of 
control mechanisms in each of the project phases. 
Thus, this paper tries to address this gap by investigating the 
changes in the variety and intensity of formal and informal control 
mechanisms across different phases of OSD projects. In 
particular, the paper tries to identify important factors that trigger 
changes in the amount of control in different project phases. 
Furthermore, these findings are linked to project success, 
suggesting refining the relationship between amount of control 
and success variables. Using a comparative case study approach, 
we propose seven propositions refining the relationship between 
the amount of control and its influencing factors across different 
phases of control. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Exercise of Control  
In accordance with previous studies, this papers views control in a 
behavioral sense, which means that the controllees are influenced 
to act according to objectives and goals set by the controller [26]. 
This view is based on agency and organization theories and is 
consistent with prior IS studies [20, 24, 25, 27]. 
Usually, a control situation involves an individual exercising 
control (the controller) and an individual being controlled (the 
controllee) [20]. However, this clear distinction becomes difficult 
in the OSD context [25]. For instance, the controller and the 
controllee may not be single individuals but teams of individuals 
representing their organizational unit or organization respectively. 
Furthermore, in an OSD project the supplier project manager may 
be controlled by the client and, in turn, may control the supplier 
project team members. Often, project managers prevent direct 
contact to the supplier‘s project team making it difficult to directly 
influence their behavior [20]. 
Category Mode Approach 
Formal 
control 
Behavior Definition and monitoring of the 
process to achieve desired outputs 
Outcome Specification and measurement of 
outputs (both interim and final) 
Informal 
control 
Clan Reliance on the group, or clan, to 
monitor and control itself 
Self Reliance on the individuals to 
monitor and control themselves 
Table 1: Control modes 
From a behavioral perspective four control modes can be 
distinguished (see Table 1). These four control modes can be 
grouped into formal and informal control modes. Formal control 
can be viewed as a performance evaluation strategy [28] and are 
split into behavior and outcome control. Behavior control is 
exercised when procedures and rules that are applied are pre-
specified and if rewards are based on the extent to which the 
controlee follows the procedures [26, 28]. Outcome control can be 
exercised when targets or specific outcomes are specified and 
when the controlee is rewarded for meeting these given goals. 
In contrast to formal modes of control, which ignore self-
regulating and interpersonal dynamics that influence behavior, 
informal controls embrace social or people strategies [28, 29]. 
Informal controls consist of clan and self control. Clan control is 
likened to the cohesive practices of a group and is typified by the 
degree to which all members of a group are committed to 
achieving group goals. Self control is solely reliant on an 
individual‘s ability to monitor and control their own behaviors, 
with appropriate rewards and sanctions as required. 
Various control mechanisms are available – some of them can 
also be used for exercising more than one control mode. 
Typically, the controller uses a portfolio of control consisting of 
several control mechanisms of different control modes [27]. This 
portfolio is subject to modifications and adoptions throughout the 
entire project [20, 25], frequently referred to as the dynamics of 
control [24, 25]. 
2.2 Amount of Control  
This paper adopts Rustagi et al.‘s notion of the amount of control. 
They define the amount of control as ―the variety of mechanisms 
used by a client to exercise control over a vendor and the extent to 
which each of those mechanisms is used‖ [1, p. 129]. 
Consequently, it can be said that the amount of control consists of 
the two determinants: variety and intensity. 
Most previous research has only focused on the variety of control 
mechanisms in offshored or outsourced software development 
[24, 25]. However, particularly little effort was undertaken to 
measure the variety per control mode as well as the control 
intensity within a portfolio/mode. Here, clients usually have 
mechanisms that they primarily rely on, whereas they use other 
mechanisms as supplement [1]. Although previous studies found 
empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between the 
total amount of control and (project) performance [33, 34], there 
is no recent research taking into account the more precise 
definition of Rustagi et al.‘s notion of the amount of control. 
2.3 Dynamics of Control and Influencing 
Factors 
Dynamics of control describe how the used control mechanisms 
change during the project. Choudhury and Sabherwal [25] and 
Heiskanen et al. [30] explored those dynamics of control through 
the lens of encounters and episodes. They distinguish between 
stable, long periods—called episodes—and disrupting events 
between those episodes—called encounters. For instance, in the 
OSD context, the completion of the requirements specification 
can be seen as such an encounter ending the episode of 
requirement determination [25]. Kirsch [24] argues that 
controllers usually build their starting control portfolio by 
investigating what formal control mechanisms are available. Then 
these control mechanisms are evaluated. As a result, suitable 
mechanisms are kept, inadequate mechanisms dropped, or new 
appropriate mechanisms added to the initial control portfolio. 
Subsequent changes in control choices are then triggered by 
factors in the project, stakeholder, and global contexts. 
While there is considerable prior research on the factors that 
influence the exercise of control in general, there is only very little 
on the factors influencing the amount of control, in particular 
across different project phases. Typically, factors that influence 
the general choice of control can be categorized into controller 
and controllee [1, 26, 27, 28], project [20, 24, 25], relationship [4, 
24, 25], and task characteristics [24, 26, 27, 43]. Factors in these 
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categories (e.g., project-related knowledge, project performance, 
project stage, resource availability, task complexity, and task 
uncertainty) may also impact the amount of control exercised in 
various project stages to various degrees, but still this has not been 
sufficiently discussed in literature. So far, current research 
indicates that the project stage would influence the choice of 
control mechanisms [20, 25, 31]. Often, in some phases certain 
mechanisms proof to be inefficient and are therefore removed. 
Often, during later stages of the project other phase-specific 
mechanisms are added (such as testing) [25]. Other authors [20, 
25, 32] found a relation between project performance, control and 
certain triggering factors. They note that decreasing project 
performance, often represented by decreasing deliverable quality, 
would lead to an increase in control. For instance, Sabherwal and 
Choudhury [21, 25] state that behavior and clan control are 
introduced or increased in certain phases if problems occur during 
the project. 
2.4 Project Success 
Previous studies found empirical evidence that there is a positive 
relationship between the total amount of control and (project) 
performance [33, 34]. In the IS literature, two ways of measuring 
project success are popular [35]. The first method is to measure 
the extent to which the initial expectations are met. The second 
method is to determine the level of overall satisfaction with the 
offshoring agreement. This paper uses a mixture of both methods 
considering several success variables, such as delivery in time, 
project costs, project quality [36] and customer satisfaction with 
the offshoring agreement [35]. 
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to answer our research questions, we adopted a 
comparative case study approach, guided by the process described 
by Eisenhardt [37]. She draws from both interpretivists and 
positivists in developing her theory-building process. Similar to 
Kirsch‘s study on the dynamics of control [20], our research 
approach was designed to investigate pre-identified constructs 
from a positivist view as well as to surface new constructs in an 
interpretive manner [20]. This hybrid approach can be 
characterized as ―soft positivism‖ or ―scientific realism‖ [38]. 
Our rationale for selecting cases was based on purposeful 
maximum sampling in order to show different perspectives on the 
issue [44]. Therefore, our cases were heterogeneous in terms of 
scope, clients, suppliers, and outsourcing locations. In particular, 
cases were selected in which a significant number of employees 
were located either offshore or nearshore. Such projects tend to be 
particularly challenging for the project management, requiring a 
wide range of control mechanisms. In order to allow for 
comparison across cases only cases that followed a sequential 
project phase methodology were selected. This resulted in a 
selection of nine OSD project cases.  
3.1 Cases 
A short description of each case including general information 
about project volume, employees involved, outsourcing location, 
etc. can be found in the appendix (Table 2) as well as the amount 
of control in the corresponding project phases (Table 3). 
About half of the cases included farshoring to countries in Asia 
such as India. Two cases examined nearshoring arrangements to 
Eastern European countries (Poland and Slovakia). The remaining 
cases covered nearshoring projects in Africa or Western Europe 
(e.g., Italy and Spain). One quarter of the projects involved 
captive offshoring, meaning that the supplier is a legal entity of 
the client. The other cases were about offshore outsourcing, 
connoting that the project was either outsourced to a multinational 
service provider with offshoring capabilities or a local vendor in 
an offshore/nearshore country. 
Our study covers various project volumes, ranging from € 20.000 
to more than € 100 million. A vast majority of the cases had a 
total project volume of less than € 5 million. Half of the clients 
negotiated time and material contracts. One client added a cap 
limit to the contract to minimize possible additional costs. All 
other clients had fixed price agreements with their vendors. The 
offshore team size varied from 4 to over 300. However, around 
half of the regarded projects involved less than 50 offshore 
employees. The length of the projects ranged from 4 months for a 
web-portal development to over 6 years for a SAP implementation 
involving multiple rollouts in different locations. Five projects 
had duration of less than 2 years. 
3.2 Data Collection  
Between February and April 2010, we interviewed 12 project and 
program managers. The semi-structured interviews followed 
Myers and Newman‘s guidelines for qualitative interviewing [39]. 
Due to the very large size of some projects, work stream leads 
were interviewed as well. The average interviewee had almost 
twelve years of IT working experience and around five years of 
offshore experience. The interviews lasted between one and two 
hours. Before the interviews, an interview guideline was sent to 
all participants. This guideline contained definitions of control, 
the research objectives and a set of sample questions. For 
simplifying the analysis of the data, the authors introduced a 
generic three phase project model consisting of the stages 
requirements determination, system development and system 
implementation. The interview partners were then asked how 
control was carried out in each project phase. In order to avoid 
interview bias, questions and the following discussions were 
adapted to the interview partner‘s specific context and role. We 
also interviewed multiple project team members in each case. This 
helped in refining and validating the findings. In case of any 
discrepancy in the statements or findings, they were solved 
together with the interview partners.  
The interview itself was split into three parts. In the first part, 
general information about the interview partner and the project 
under study was gathered. The second part consisted of questions 
regarding the variety of control mechanisms applied and the 
intensity with which these mechanisms were exercised. For this 
reason, a non exhaustive list of control mechanisms for each 
control mode was used in the interviews. Here, the interviewee 
was asked open questions regarding the mechanisms. Not yet 
listed mechanisms were added to the list. After this open 
discussion part, the interviewer asked specifically for the 
remaining, not mentioned mechanisms in the list. The intensity 
was determined by asking the interview partner which 
mechanisms or modes were relatively important compared to 
others. Sometimes a top list was compiled together with the 
interviewee. Next, the influencing factors for the identified 
amount of control were discussed. The third part consisted of 
simple questions for evaluating the outcomes and the success of 
the respective offshore software project. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
For data analysis, the interviews were merged into nine case 
summaries. These were then checked by the interview partners for 
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correctness and completeness of the data. In order to avoid bias, 
other project team members reviewed the case summary in most 
cases. To achieve a more macro view on each case, we compared 
across cases. The following steps were carried out: 
Step 1: Identification of amount of control per project phase 
In order to identify the amount of control per project phase, we 
performed the following steps for each project and project phase: 
First, the mechanisms of each control mode were determined and 
counted. The intensity of each control mode was estimated by 
deriving it from the cases (from very low to very high). Second, 
the variety of mechanisms was translated into a qualitative 
variable (see scale above). Here, we went through all projects to 
determine the maximum number of concurrently used 
mechanisms within one control mode. For instance, the highest 
number of mechanisms applied for outcome control was 10. Thus, 
10 represented the highest achievable variety for this control 
mode, 0 the lowest. This method was applied for the other control 
modes as well. Third, by calculating the average between both 
variables we derived the amount of control from the identified 
mechanism variety and intensity. In cases where the amount was 
in between two values, it was rounded up. The results were 
verified by reviewing the cases again. Finally, the overall amount 
of control was calculated by using the average of all control 
modes. The overall amount of control was checked by again 
comparing the result with the case description. 
Step 2: Identification of influencing factors 
During the interviews, we asked about changes in control 
mechanisms and intensities in all project phases. We also asked if 
there were any concerns regarding too much or too little control 
exercised by the client. In addition, with the help of the 
interviewee we identified disrupting events or changing external 
or internal influences in the projects. This helped identifying 
influencing factors for the dynamics of control. 
This procedure was followed for each of the project phases, 
enabling us to examine changes across different project phases. 
The factors influencing the amount of control were determined by 
analyzing answers to the open questions posed during the 
interviews. After a couple of interviews, the common drivers for 
the control amounts emerged and the open questioning was 
extended by direct questions regarding specific influencing 
factors. 
Step 3: Drawing conclusions 
In order to draw conclusions, the findings had to be aggregated on 
the case level. This was done with the help of overview charts. By 
examining these overview charts, patterns shared by the projects 
were identified. In addition, project characteristics and the 
information gathered during the interviews were used for 
explaining the control changes during the project. We also 
identified cross-case patterns, investigated salient features in the 
case descriptions, and tried to explain possible (statistical) outliers 
by using available case data. Finally, data on project success was 
mapped to the amount of control. All findings were subsequently 
compared with previous research in order to draw final 
conclusions and explain the findings. 
4. AMOUNT OF CONTROL ACROSS 
PROJECT PHASES 
Similar to prior research to map control to project phases a very 
generic three phase software project approach was used, 
consisting of requirements determination, the development and 
the subsequent implementation phase [4]. The macro view on all 
projects showed that the overall amount of control ranged from 
low to very high. The breakdown of all amounts can be seen in the 
appendix (see Table 3). Most projects used a rather high amount 
of control. 
4.1 Requirements Determination Phase  
All project except C4 and C11 applied control mechanisms 
already in the first project phase. The two exceptions had not yet 
brought offshore employees into their projects due to trainings or 
lack of need. C10 on the other hand, brought in their offshore 
team in the middle of the requirements analysis phase. 
In particular, C2, C3, C6 and C7 used high amounts of outcome 
control. In contrast, C8 and C10 applied only medium amounts of 
control. C8‘s medium outcome control was the result of the 
vendor not thoroughly reviewing the results in that phase. C10 
brought in the offshore team after half of the phase, when a lot of 
work had already been conducted. All sequential projects used 
project plans with deadlines and milestones. Other popular 
mechanisms included reviewing deliverables, controlling the 
client‘s prototypes, preliminary deliverables and functional 
specifications. This finding supports Choudhury and Sabherwal 
[25] findings that control portfolios in outsourced software 
projects are dominated by outcome control, especially in the 
beginning of the project. 
Behavior control was also exercised to a high extent. In four cases 
the amount of control was high (C2, C3, and C6) to very high 
(C7). In most of these cases team travelling communication 
mechanisms were heavily used. In contrast, C8, C10 and C12 had 
rather low amounts of behavior control in place, mainly because 
the client was only able to directly influence the vendor 
management but not the individuals, a phenomenon which 
typically occur in OSD settings. 
The amount of clan control varied significantly in the cases. On 
the one hand, projects such as C2, C3 and C7 utilized a broad 
range of clan control mechanisms. Temporary co-location was 
one of the key factors for these high amounts of clan control. On 
the other hand, other projects such as C6, C10 and C12 neglected 
clan control in the first phase. Reasons for this varied: in C6, for 
example, client and offshore teams were brought together later in 
the project; in C12 the project managers thought that clan controls 
were not necessary or even inefficient in this phase; and finally in 
C10 the vendor tried to hide the project staff behind anonymous 
services. 
The amount of self control ranged from very high (C7) to very 
low (C10 and C12). In general, self control was the least used 
control mode. The data did not indicate a link to project size, 
strategic importance or any other variable, thus suggesting other 
factors being important predictors of self control. For example 
data from C7 shows that the high amount of informal control, in 
particular self control was strongly influenced by experiences 
gathered from prior OSD projects. In C10 the project manager had 
bad experiences in using informal control, so the project setup did 
not plan for these kinds of controls. 
4.2 System Development Phase  
In the system development phase, all projects utilized the near-
/offshore resources for software development tasks. This phase 
was characterized by an increase of the amount of control. 
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As in the previous phase, outcome control remained the most 
important control mode. Moreover, in five of nine cases, the 
amount of outcome control was enhanced compared to the 
requirements determination phase (e.g. C2, C6, C7, C8 and C10). 
In the rest of the cases, the amount stayed on the same levels as in 
the previous phase. This increase is the result of new outcome 
control mechanisms being added to the existing portfolio. For 
instance testing, code reviews etc. supplemented existing outcome 
controls (see section 5). Another reason is that some projects ran 
into problems requiring an increase in outcome control. 
The amount of behavior control increased in this phase as well. In 
C2, C6, C8 and C10 for instance, it increased, whereas it stayed 
on the same level in the other cases. Team travelling and intense 
communication were the drivers for this increase. In C4 and C11 
exercising behavior control was difficult, because of the vendor 
trying to inhibit direct influence and monitoring of behavior. 
However, behavior control was still the second most popular 
control mode and our data shows a moderate increase of the 
amount of behavior control. This confirms Choudhury and 
Sabherwal‘s [25] findings that behavior control mechanisms are 
often added later in the project. For instance in C6 intense 
communication and collaboration also intensified the amount of 
behavior control, exercised by mechanisms such as imposing 
procedures guiding programming, documenting and testing. 
Clan control increased in three of nine projects (C6, C8 and C10). 
This was caused by intensified team travelling during system 
development. In C7 the amount of clan control decreased, because 
the co-location was abandoned due to cost reasons. In C4 and C11 
the offshore sources had just been added to the project. Due to the 
vendor preventing direct contact, the amount of clan control was 
rather low in these two projects. 
Self control only increased in two projects (and decreased in one 
project). The overall amount remained low compared to the other 
control modes. In the other projects it remained untouched. 
4.3 System Implementation Phase  
In the system implementation, some projects (e.g. C6 and C8) 
slowly pulled out their offshore teams. No data on this phase was 
available in C2, because the project had not yet started with 
system implementation. 
In three cases the amount of outcome control was reduced (C7, 
C10 and C11). In all other projects, the amount of control 
remained on a similar level. This may be explained by the 
removal of several outcome based controls initialized in the 
previous phase. For instance, in C11 extensive testing was 
abandoned, resulting in a lesser amount of control. In C7 on the 
other hand, the intensity of the existing mechanisms was reduced 
because of cost reasons. 
Behavior control was also reduced (C3, C8 and C11). Again this 
was due to the fact that certain mechanisms of the previous phase 
were abandoned. For example in C4 and C9 co-location of project 
staff was not extensively required anymore. 
The amount of clan control decreased in four projects (C7, C8, 
C10 and C11). This can be explained by the offshore sources not 
being involved to a high extent in the last phase. Socializing and 
co-location had no further use and thus, they were abandoned for 
those cases. However, in other projects, the amount stayed on the 
same level (C3, C4 and C7). The offshore sources were utilized in 
these phases for (multiple) roll-outs of the software. For this 
reason, during this phase they were still involved to a higher 
degree. 
Self control was not reduced as strongly as the other control 
modes. It was solely reduced in C11 due to less team travelling 
and socializing. This can also be explained by the rather low level 
of self control in most projects throughout all phases. 
5. DISCUSSION – INFLUENCING 
FACTORS 
What are the factors behind the changes in variety and intensity of 
formal and informal control mechanisms across different phases 
of OSD projects? This was the second part of the research 
question posed at the beginning of the paper. The changing 
amount of control during the project can only partly be explained 
by the changing needs in each phase [e.g. 20, 40, 31]. In addition, 
the global context and the influences of involved stakeholders 
require alterations of the amounts of control during these phases. 
Further explanations and refinements are consolidated into the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 1: Intensive testing leads to an increase of the 
amount of formal control 
In the system development phase intensive testing took place. In 
six of nine projects, testing mechanisms, code reviews or the joint 
specification test cases were added with high intensity to the 
formal control portfolio (C2, C3, C6, C7, C10 and C11). For 
instance, in C10 a wide range of testing mechanisms was 
introduced, such as regular reviews of test plans, actual module 
and functional tests. These mechanisms were not necessary in the 
first phase. In C6 an automated testing system was used for 
assembly and module tests. During the night, this tool tested 
previously checked-in code. If errors occurred, the responsible 
person was notified by the system about errors or warnings. Most 
of these newly introduced mechanisms were dropped in the 
following phase, because they were not required for the user 
acceptance or functional system test, some others continued, such 
as the manual user interface test (C7). 
Proposition 2: High communication intensity in the systems 
development phase leads to an increase of the amount of clan 
control 
Compared to other phases we observed a relatively high amount 
of clan control in the development phase. In three out of nine 
projects it increased. A possible explanation might be the high 
communication intensity in this phase, as evidenced in C6, C7 and 
C8. For instance, in C6 communication increased as the 
relationship between the client and vendor teams became closer 
(see also proposition 4). Another possible explanation is that 
cultural differences typically emerge in phases with high 
communication needs, such as the systems development phase. 
These can be facilitated by the use of informal controls [20]. 
Proposition 3: Changing team involvement requires changes in 
the amount of formal and informal control 
In some projects, the near-/ offshore teams were introduced later 
in the project (e.g. C4, C10, and C11). In other projects, the 
offshore teams were only marginally involved in the system 
implementation phase (C6 and C8). This changing team 
involvement required changes in the amount of formal and 
informal control. For example, in C6 the offshore team was only 
marginally involved in the system implementation phase. As a 
result the control mechanisms were significantly reduced. Since 
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no outcomes were delivered by the offshore team, no outcome 
control was exercised at all. Communication with the Indian team 
members took place on demand whenever issues arose and needed 
clarification. This finding can partly be explained by prior 
research stating that the choice of particular control mechanisms 
further depends on the knowledge of the stakeholders as well as 
the relationship between these stakeholders. Thus, with new team 
members joining and pulling out of the project, knowledge of 
controller and controlee and its relationships will change as well 
[4]. 
Proposition 4: Trust between client an OSD provider leads to a 
decrease of the amount of formal control and an increase in the 
amount of informal control 
In particular, with new team members entering the project the 
relationship between controller and controlee might evolve 
towards a more trustful relationship [20]. Trust might lead to a 
decrease of formal controls and an increase in informal controls 
[20]. This became particularly evident in C11 where the vendor 
shifted some of his Indian employees onsite for improving 
communication and increasing productivity. During these team 
member stays, socializing among offshore and onsite employees 
was an important trust building mechanism and was facilitated in 
particular during lunches or private conversations. Altogether trust 
was built up, which in turn reduced the amount of formal control 
in this project. 
Proposition 5a: Quality problems during the project lead to an 
increase of the amount of formal control 
In total, four of the nine projects ran into quality problems during 
the project (C2, C3, C8 and C11). These were mainly caused by 
conflicting perceptions in quality or miscommunication. In some 
projects deadlines elapsed without delivery of satisfactory results 
from the vendor. As a result, the client increased the amount of 
formal controls in all projects but C8. In C8 the client trusted the 
vendor in solving the quality issues himself. While most clients 
increased both outcome and behavior control (C2 and C3) one 
client enhanced solely the amount of outcome control (C11). 
This result is not surprising and various authors have argued that 
project performance problems influence control [25, 20, 41]. 
Rustagi et al. [1] findings support the claim that task uncertainty 
which may be caused by erratic quality is positively associated 
with the total amount of formal control. Moreover, Heiskanen et 
al. [32] investigated the influence of project performance 
problems on outcome control. They found that when quality 
problems arise, clients mitigate this by extending the amount of 
outcome control. Sabherwal and Choudhury [21, 25] partly 
support this finding as well. They found out that if problems arise, 
the client usually introduces more behavior and clan control. 
Interestingly, our data only supports a positive relationship 
between project performance problems and behavior control but 
not between project performance problems and clan control. 
Proposition 5b: Quality problems during the project do not 
necessarily lead to an increase of the amount of informal 
control 
Researchers have discussed the relationship between project 
performance problems and control [25, 20, 41]. Sabherwal and 
Choudhury [21, 25] stated that usually clan control is enhanced or 
introduced when problems occur in a project. This relation is not 
supported by our data. As described above, four projects ran into 
quality problems (C2, C3, C8 and C11). However, in our cases the 
amount of informal control seemed to be unrelated to those 
emerging quality issues. In C2 and C3 the amount of informal 
control remained on a similar level. The problems were instead 
mitigated with the help of formal control. In C8 the amount of 
control was slightly increased. This was done because the client 
trusted the vendor to solve the issues himself. C11 showed an 
increase of the amount of formal control after the problems 
occurred, while the informal control was minimally decreased. 
This was the result of the vendor trying to prevent direct 
governance and control between the client and his offshore 
sources. 
Proposition 5c: Quality problems during the project lead to the 
introduction of new control mechanisms 
As described above, in some phases entirely new mechanisms are 
introduced, whereas others are abandoned. A good example is the 
usage of additional deliverable control mechanisms. In a few 
cases the vendor was required to present prototypes for reviews 
(C7, C8 and C12). Other examples of this practice include C2, 
where additional new outcome control mechanisms were added, 
such as preliminary deliverables, which were then pre-checked by 
the client. As a result, due to poor quality of early deliverables the 
intensity of outcome control increased significantly. 
Proposition 6: Good quality of deliverables reduces the amount 
of control  
In a few cases (C3, C11) the quality of deliverables increased, 
after having tackled the quality problems encountered in prior 
phases. In general we found that the client reduced the amount of 
control after the project was running smoothly. One possible 
explanation for this is that the introduction of high amounts of 
control will also increase the costs associated with these controls. 
As soon as the project requires less attention, control is reduced 
for saving costs. This relation could also be explained by an 
increase of trust between client and vendor after the project was 
running smoothly [1]. 
Proposition 7: The amount of control is not directly related to 
project success 
Finally, we made a more general observation, not necessarily 
linked to the changes of the amount of control across project 
phases – the link between the amount of control and project 
success. 
Project success was determined according to the method described 
in section 2.4. The data indicates that there is no relation between 
project success and control. For instance, project success in highly 
controlled projects such as C1 and C10 was considered to be low 
by the project managers. This finding contrasts previous research 
[18, 33, 34, 42] that found a positive relation between control and 
project success.  
A possible explanation might be that projects with quality or 
scope problems tend to exercise more formal control (see 
proposition 5). If the project management cannot solve the quality 
issues, the overall amount of control may remain on a high level. 
Thus, despite a high amount of control, the desired project success 
might not be achieved. Another interviewed manager (C9) stated 
that by monitoring the vendor too closely, possible problems are 
uncovered that would have remained undetected with low 
amounts of control. These detected problems are usually solved 
by the vendor before the deadlines and thus, they do not affect 
project success that much. This rather surprising result should be 
investigated further. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
While prior research has investigated antecedents of control in 
general, as well as the dynamics of control across project phases 
[1, 21, 24, 25], there has been only very little research on the 
dynamic changes in the variety and intensity of formal and 
informal control mechanisms across different stages of OSD 
projects. Thus, the unique contributions of this paper are (1) to 
have provided further empirical work on the still neglected area of 
‗amount of control‘, (2) to have taken on a dynamic perspective, 
by investigating the amount of control across different project 
phases, (3) to have identified important factors that trigger 
changes in the amount of control in these phases, and finally (4) to 
have challenged common assumptions that the amount of control 
is directly related to project success [18, 33, 34, 42]. In particular 
the latter is an important finding and suggests that this direct 
relationship needs to be revisited as there might be mediation or 
moderation effects responsible for these results. 
The first most obvious finding confirms prior research that the 
amount of control varies as the project progresses [20. 25]. As 
such, the amount of control is strongly influenced by the project 
phase [e.g. 29, 40, 31]. Furthermore, our results provide a clearer 
picture on control modes being used, their intensity in each phase 
and how they change across phases. For example, in both the 
systems determination phase and the system development phase in 
seven out of nine projects the amount of formal control increased 
(C2, C6, C7, C8, and C10) or stayed on the same level (C3, C12). 
Our data also shows a moderate increase of the amount of 
behavior control, thus confirming Choudhury and Sabherwal‘s 
[21, 25] findings that behavior control mechanisms are often 
added later in the project. 
Additionally, we could confirm that quality problems during the 
project lead to an increase of formal amount of control [1]. 
However, these problems do not necessarily lead to an increase of 
informal amount of control, in particular clan control [21, 25]. In 
return, an increase in the quality of deliverables will decrease the 
amount of control in subsequent project phases. In general it was 
interesting to see that in all projects self-control played a minor 
role. This certainly warrants further attention and calls for further 
in-depth studies to explore possible explanations for this finding. 
Furthermore, we found that intensive testing will lead to an 
increase of the amount of formal control, whereas trust will lead 
to a decrease of the amount of formal control. We also found that 
changing team involvement required changes in the amount of 
formal and informal control. So far, this finding has not been 
acknowledged in prior literature.  
There are, of course, limitations to our study that may provide 
interesting paths for future explorations. First, we made some 
trade-offs in regard to measuring the amount of control. Here, the 
variety of control mechanisms was determined in relation to the 
maximal number of mode-specific mechanisms in all examined 
projects whereas the intensity of each mechanism was determined 
by relating this control mechanism to all other mechanisms used 
in a particular project. Second, this research made no distinction 
between far- and nearshoring within the same OSD project. In all 
three corresponding cases (C3, C6, and C11), far- and nearshore 
teams were using different control modes. Therefore, it might be 
interesting to further explore these differences with regard to 
control choices and amounts within the specific sub-projects. 
Finally, our data was drawn from a comparative case study 
approach resulting in a number of propositions. The next logical 
step would be to further refine some of these propositions and test 
these with the help of a large-scale quantitative study. 
Altogether, this study contributes to the further understanding of 
the complex interplay between the amount of control, its 
influencing factors and its relationship to project success. 
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